Hostile Work Environment Claims in the Wake of Corbitt and Reeves

We frequently advise clients that what is alleged to be “sexual harassment” and what is considered “actionable sexual harassment” are frequently not the same and that conduct that may be considered by most laymen to constitute “sexual harassment” is not “actionable sexual harassment” in the Eleventh Circuit.  This point has never been more clear than in the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision of Corbitt v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 589 F.3d 1136 (11th Cir. 2009), which may have made proving a hostile work environment claim virtually impossible.

In this decision, the Court reiterated that the “sufficiently severe or pervasive” requirement for a hostile work environment claim does not include “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.”  However, the Court went a step further and found much of the conduct alleged to have created a hostile work environment to be simple flirtation, which is “part of ordinary socializing in the workplace and should not be mistaken for discriminatory conditions of employment.”  The conduct at issue, made by a male supervisor to two male subordinate employees, included physical conduct such as:

- Putting his hand on the employee’s thigh;
- Pressing his body against the employee such that the supervisor’s body was touching the employee’s “privates;”
- Massaging of the neck and shoulders;

and comments such as:

- Telling that the employee was “the Italian heifer that I like;”
- Telling the employee that he was “cute;”
- Asking the employee whether he was happily married;
- Telling the employee that his hair was beautiful and that he liked his green eyes;
- Telling the employee that he “like[s] the rough look;”
- Commenting that he could show the employee how to be gay and he would “like it;”
- Questioning whether the employee “wore boxers or briefs or nothing;”
- Asking if the employee colored his hair and remarking that it must be the employee’s “natural color down there;”
- Recommending various gay websites so the employee “could see what [the supervisor] is talking about;”
- Stating that the employee was not his “usual type” but that he “could not stop thinking about” the employee;
- Commenting that he liked the employee’s “baby face” and that he was “small and cute;”
- Inviting the employee to come to his hotel room on two occasions.

In Corbitt, the Eleventh Circuit held that, even if the alleged conduct was frequent, the majority of the alleged touchings were not offensive and were not sufficiently severe to support a hostile work environment claim.  The Court explicitly rejected the idea that the supervisor’s conduct was more severe because it was directed at someone of the same sex, rather than the opposite sex.  Moreover, the Court held that, while some of the comments may have been offensive, the fact that the majority of the comments were not offensive and were made over the telephone led to the conclusion that they were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment.

 After the opinion in Corbitt, it appeared that a plaintiff’s burden to prove a hostile work environment became a lot heavier.  However, just a month after the decision, the Eleventh Circuit issued a landmark opinion that significantly favors plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases, holding that certain gender-specific words like “b*tch” can be enough to create a hostile work environment, even if they are not used explicitly in reference to the plaintiff.  Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 2010 WL 174074 (11th Cir., Jan. 20, 2010).

 Ingrid Reeves worked as a transportation sales representative for C.H. Robinson and claimed she was subjected to hearing words such as “b*tch,”  “wh*re,” and “c*nt” from male co-workers on a daily basis, although there was no evidence that the words were directed personally towards her.  Most of the language was used in conversations she overheard between co-workers and in sexual jokes exchanged around the workplace.  In March 2004, Reeves resigned and sued the company, alleging she had been subjected to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  The trial court granted summary judgment to C.H. Robinson on the ground that the alleged harassment was not “based on” Reeves’s sex, a requirement for proving a hostile work environment under federal law.  On appeal, an Eleventh Circuit panel stated that it was explicitly holding for the first time that “sex-specific” language satisfies the “based on” requirement for a hostile work environment claim even when the language does not “target” the plaintiff.

On rehearing before all active judges, the court unanimously held that words and conduct that are sufficiently gender-specific and either severe or pervasive may state a claim of a hostile work environment, even if the words are not directed specifically at the plaintiff.  Judge Stanley Marcus, who wrote the opinion, stated: “It is enough to hear co-workers on a daily basis refer to female colleagues as ‘b*tches,’ ‘wh*res’ and ‘c*nts,’ to understand that they view women negatively, and in a humiliating or degrading way.”  C.H. Robinson maintained that its employees used the words to refer to both men and women and that, therefore, the terms cannot themselves be gender-specific.  Marcus rejected the argument, noting that such words have gender-specific meanings.  “Calling a man a ‘b*tch’ belittles him precisely because it belittles women.  It implies that the male object of ridicule is a lesser man and feminine, and may not belong in the workplace.  Indeed, it insults the man by comparing him to a woman, and, thereby, could be taken as humiliating to women as a group as well.”  The evidence, therefore, was sufficient so that a jury could reasonably find a hostile work environment.

It is not known whether C.H. Robinson will petition the Supreme Court for review, but for the moment, the Eleventh Circuit’s unanimous decision marks a major victory for plaintiffs alleging sexual harassment in the workplace.  Furthermore, many employers will likely be forced to revise their harassment policies or implement additional training in order to protect themselves from liability.

The full opinions can be accessed at no cost from the Eleventh Circuit’s website at www.ca11.uscourts.gov.

The attorneys at Buckley Brown are available to assist you in preventing and defending sexual harassment and other employment discrimination claims.

For more information, please contact Tim Buckley at (404) 633-9230.

Employer Liability Limited for Alcohol-Related Injuries at Work-Sponsored Events

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently held that an employer could not be held liable to an employee injured at a work-sponsored party based on the fact that the employer provided alcoholic beverages.  Solley v. Mullins Trucking Co., Inc., 2009 WL 4681036 (Ga.App. Dec. 10, 2009).

Jimmy Mullins was the sole officer and shareholder of Mullins Trucking, and Barbara Solley was employed as its office manager.  On March 17, 2006, Mullins Trucking hosted its annual party at a hotel; the company provided food and alcoholic beverages.  During the party, Mullins became intoxicated and allegedly assaulted Solley in her hotel room.  Solley subsequently filed a complaint against Mullins Trucking, alleging that the company was negligent in hosting a party with alcohol and in failing to stop a dangerous activity of which it was aware.  Solley argued that the company owed her a duty equivalent to a landowner’s duty to protect a social guest from the reasonably anticipated conduct of another.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mullins Trucking, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.

Providers of alcohol are insulated from third-party claims of negligence except as provided in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40, which applies to individual and employers.  Specifically, “…a person who…knowingly sells, furnishes, or serves alcoholic beverages to a person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication, knowing that such person will soon be driving a motor vehicle, may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such…person when the sale, furnishing, or serving is the proximate cause of such injury or damage.”  Here, Solley’s injuries were not the result of a motor vehicle accident proximately caused by Mullins Trucking serving alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated person.  Furthermore, because the statute specifically sets forth that only the consumption, not the service of alcohol, is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by the intoxicated person, Mullins Trucking could not be held liable for Solley’s injuries.  Therefore, the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment in favor of Mullins Trucking.

For more information, please contact Tim Buckley at (404) 633-9230.

Independent Contractors Do Not Shield Landowners from Statutory Duty to Repair Premises

A recent decision limits a landowner’s protection for the negligent acts of subcontractors.  The Georgia Court of Appeals recently held that a landowner can be liable for an independent contractor’s actions in repairing the premises where the alleged act is a violation of a statutorily imposed duty.  Atkins v. MRP Park Lake, L.P., 2009 WL 3931525 (Ga.App. Nov. 20, 2009).

After a tornado struck an apartment complex owned by MRP and managed by Realty Management, Whatley Construction was hired as a contractor to assist in the clean up.  When Atkins complained that the roof in her apartment was leaking, a subcontractor discovered that a temporary tarp had become detached from the roof and assigned two Whatley employees to reattach it.  However, the tarp covered the vent pipes in the roof, trapping carbon monoxide inside Atkins’s apartment.  Three days later, Atkins was hospitalized and diagnosed with carbon monoxide poisoning.  Joined by her husband, Atkins sued MRP, Realty, and Whatley, asserting claims of negligence in carrying out the landowner’s duty to repair.  The trial court granted summary judgment to MRP and Realty, ruling that Whatley’s status as an independent contractor exonerated them from liability.  The court of appeals disagreed and reversed.

Although an employer is generally not responsible for torts committed by independent contractors, O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(4) carves out an exception if the alleged wrongful act is a violation of a duty imposed by statute.  Therefore, a landowner cannot insulate itself from liability simply by hiring an independent contractor to perform the landowner’s statutorily-imposed duties, and it is irrelevant whether the landowner had any knowledge of the resulting dangerous condition.  Stated differently, the knowledge of an independent contractor is legally attributed to the landowner where the independent contractor is performing duties statutorily imposed on the landowner.  Specifically, O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-13 and 44-7-14 require a landowner to “keep the rented premises in good repair” and impose liability on the landlord for “damages resulting from defects in the premises.”  Furthermore, under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-2(b)(1), a landlord is liable when the repairs are “completed so negligently that a defect in the premises remains despite the attempted repair.”  Therefore, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that MRP and Realty could be liable for Whatley’s negligence in repairing the roof.

For more information, please contact Tim Buckley at (404) 633-9230.

Idiopathic Injuries in the Workplace: Compensable?

In order for a workplace injury to be compensable, it must arise out of and in the course of employment.  An injury arises out of employment where there is some causal connection between the conditions under which the employee worked and the resulting injury.  For example, if a warehouse employee hurts his back while picking up a box, the injury likely arises out of his employment because the heavy lifting required by the job caused the injury.  But what if an employee is injured as a result of an “idiopathic” accident?  An idiopathic injury is an injury arising spontaneously or from an obscure or unknown cause or from a personal condition of the employee. 

Generally, idiopathic injuries are not compensable because they do not arise out of employment, even if they do occur in the course of employment.  However, the courts recognize a narrow exception when the employee comes into contact with some object specifically related to the employment because of the increased risk caused by the presence of the employment-related object.  For example, in U.S. Cas. Co. v. Richardson, 75 Ga.App. 496 (1947), an employee with an epileptic condition suffered a seizure and fell in such a way that he struck the sharp edge of a work table, and the court found the injury to be compensable because the table increased the risk of injury from an otherwise idiopathic fall.  The court also held that an idiopathic injury may be compensable if it occurs “on a stairway or into a machine or against anything except the bare floor, and especially if the fall is from a height, as the risk of injury is increased, or is a special danger of the employment.”  By contrast, in Prudential Bank v. Moore, 219 Ga.App. 847 (1996), the employee fainted and struck her head on the baseboard of a wall at her workplace, but the court rejected the argument that the baseboard was a work-related object.  The court held that a baseboard, just like a floor, is a mere structural hazard that the claimant is equally exposed to apart from her employment.  In a more recent case, Chaparral Boats, Inc. v. Heath, 269 Ga.App. 339 (2004), the employee was walking at a rapid pace when she suddenly felt pain in her left knee, but there was no evidence that she slipped, tripped, or fell at the time of the injury, nor was there any evidence that she came into contact with any object.  The court reaffirmed the holding in Richardson and found that because the employee “did not fall from a height or strike any work-related object when she incurred the knee injury, there was no basis for concluding that the injury was compensable.”

Consequently, whether an idiopathic injury is compensable will depend on the facts  surrounding the accident: “Where the cause of the fall is personal to the worker (as a non-industrial heart attack, dizzy or epileptic spells, or any idiopathic condition) the fact that the floor is of rough cement instead of wood and hence more dangerous, is no ground for an award…But awards are upheld…if the fall is on a stairway or into a machine or against anything except the bare floor, and especially if the fall is from a height, as the risk of injury is increased, or is a special danger of the employment.”  Chaparral Boats, 269 Ga.App. at 347.

For more information, please contact Tim Buckley at (404) 633-9230.

Traffic Citation is a “Crime” that Tolls Limitations Period for Personal Injury Action

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently held that a traffic citation can constitute a criminal proceeding under a statute that tolls the limitation period for filing personal injury actions.  Beneke v. Parker, 2009 WL 3062640 (Ga. Sept. 28, 2009).

On April 27, 2005, Patricia Parker was injured when the car in which she was a passenger was struck by a vehicle driven by Alan Beneke, who received a traffic citation for following too closely.  When Parker filed a personal injury action against Beneke on May 11, 2007, Beneke argued that the two-year statute of limitations had expired.  However, the trial court found that the statute had not begun to run until Beneke posted a cash bond disposing of his citation on May 19, 2005.  In denying summary judgment to Beneke, the court relied on O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99, which provides that:

The running of the period of limitations with respect to any cause of action in tort that may be brought by the victim of an alleged crime which arises out of the facts and circumstances relating to the commission of such alleged crime committed in this state shall be tolled from the date of the commission of the alleged crime or the act giving rise to such action in tort until the prosecution of such crime or act has become final or otherwise terminated, provided that such time does not exceed six years.

The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment but vacated the portion of the trial court’s order ruling that Beneke had committed a “crime” as a matter of law so as to bring O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 into play.  The Court held that a “crime” within the context of the particular statute must be a crime that satisfies the definition set forth in O.C.G.A. § 16-2-1(a), i.e., one that involves criminal intent or criminal negligence.

In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a violation of the Uniform Rules of the Road, such as following too closely, is a misdemeanor that satisfies the statutory definition of a crime.  Therefore, the word “crime” in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 encompassed traffic citations, and the two-year statute of limitations had not begun to run until Beneke disposed of his citation on May 19, 2005.  As the Court acknowledged, this case will have a significant impact on personal injury actions arising out of automobile accidents in situations where a traffic citation is issued.

For more information, please contact Timothy Buckley at (404) 633-9230.

Manufacturers’ Duty to Recall

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed a manufacturer’s duty to recall a product with a design defect and a party’s ability to introduce testimony and pleadings from other lawsuits involving the same defendant. Ford Motor Co. v. Reece, A09A0871 (September 16, 2009).  The issue arose from an accident in which a dump truck rear ended a 1994 Ford Tempo, pushing the car down a 371 foot embankment.  The driver of the car was paralyzed and died shortly after the accident.  The Plaintiffs alleged the Tempo’s seatback was defectively designed, causing it to collapse during the accident and resulting in more severe injuries to the driver than she would have otherwise suffered.  Plaintiffs asserted claims of negligence, strict liability, negligent failure to warn, and negligent failure to recall.  Ford argued the seat design was reasonable, protective and in line with industry standard at the time.  It also argued that the decedent’s injuries were due not to the seatback, but due to the car’s impact at the bottom of the embankment after it was rear ended.  The trial court awarded Plaintiffs compensatory damages only. 

Ford appealed, arguing: (1) the jury was erroneously instructed that there was a duty to recall when Georgia law imposes no such duty on manufacturers; (2) the jury instruction regarding the crash worthiness doctrine was misleading; (3) complaints from other lawsuits against Ford should not have been allowed to establish notice of the alleged seat defect; (4) deposition testimony from those lawsuits concerning the plaintiffs’ injuries should not have been admitted.  The Supreme Court of Georgia previously declined to address the question of whether a manufacturer had a duty to recall, thus the issue was unsettled.  The court of appeals held that the jury instruction regarding a manufacturer’s duty to recall was both legally erroneous and harmful.  It was erroneous because there was no common law or statutory duty to recall a product after the product has left the manufacturer’s control.  This limitation was necessary because without it, a manufacturer would be the perpetual insurer of its products safety.  Furthermore, such a duty would create a substantial economic burden that goes against public policy.  The court of appeals also concluded the erroneous instruction was harmful because it meant it could not determine if the verdict was entered on a proper basis.

The court of appeals briefly addressed the remaining issues raised by Ford on appeal.  Ford argued the crashworthiness doctrine was incomplete because it did not instruct the jury that Ford could limit its liability by demonstrating a basis for the apportionment of liability.  The court of appeals held any error in the instruction was not reversible because Ford did not present any evidence concerning apportionment of liability between the dump truck collision and the collapse of the seat, instead arguing the second crash, not the seatback, was the cause of the decedent’s injuries.  Thus the instruction regarding the crashworthiness doctrine was properly adjusted to the facts of the case.  Ford also argued the complaints from other cases should have been excluded because the Plaintiffs did not establish that the underlying incidents were substantially similar to the matter at hand.  The court of appeals disagreed, stating the Plaintiffs showed the other accidents were substantially similar because they involved Ford vehicles, rear impacts and seatbacks that deformed during the accidents.  Finally, Ford argued that the deposition testimony that was admitted was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.  The court of appeals disagreed, noting that although relevant evidence may damage or impair the party against which it is introduced, this does not justify its exclusion.  The testimony was admissible because it was probative concerning the injuries received under similar circumstances and was useful in enabling a jury to assess “the gravity and severity of the danger” the alleged design defect imposed.

For more information, please contact Tim Buckley at (404) 633-9230.

Court Upholds Assumption of the Risk Defense in “Car Surfing” Case

The Court of Appeals recently held that Georgia’s assumption of the risk doctrine applied in a case where a teenager was injured while “car surfing” on a friend’s automobile.  Teems v. Bates, 2009 WL 2902487 (Ga.App. Sept. 11, 2009).  Assumption of the risk is a complete defense in a lawsuit alleging negligence. 

Late one night, three friends drove to a church parking lot where Teems suggested that she and Mercurio “surf” on Bates’s car.  Mercurio was reluctant and told Teems that she thought it was dangerous.  Nevertheless, the two agreed to do it and Bates told them he would be careful driving around while they lied on top of his car.  After Teems and Mercurio took their positions on the roof of the car, Bates began driving at a speed of 10-15 miles per hour.  When he made a sharp right-hand turn, Teems was thrown from the car and onto the pavement, resulting in severe injuries. 

When Teems sued Bates for negligence, Bates responded that Teems assumed the risk of injury and that she was therefore barred from recovery.  In Georgia, the assumption of the risk defense applies if the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of the danger, (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated with the danger, and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those risks.  When a person voluntarily participates in an obviously dangerous activity, that person necessarily assumes the risks attendant to that activity.  Here, the Court held that car surfing constituted an inherently dangerous activity that posed obvious risks to anyone who participated, and despite being made aware of the danger, Teems voluntarily chose to expose herself to it. 

Interestingly, the Court likened car surfing to an amusement park thrill ride, where a person accepts the risks generated by normal changes in speed and direction.  Therefore, when Teems agreed to car surf, she assumed the risks of changes in speed and direction, including the risk that she would fall off the moving vehicle.  Therefore, because Teems assumed the risk of injury by engaging in an obviously dangerous activity, she was precluded from recovering damages, and a verdict for the defendant was affirmed.

For more information, please contact Tim Buckley at (404) 633-9230.

Notice Requirements in a Fair Labor Standards Act Lawsuit

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, and youth employment standards affecting employees in the private sector and in Federal, State, and local governments.  For the FLSA to apply, there must be an employment relationship between an employer and an employee.

In a lawsuit against an employer for claims pursuant to the FLSA, employees or former employees of a defendant may join as plaintiffs if they consent in writing and thereby “opt in.”  The preliminary determination of whether an employee should be allowed to gather information from the employer and send notice of the action.  At the preliminary stage, the plaintiff may seek “conditional certification.”  At this point, the plaintiff’s burden is very low and will likely be granted because the employer can later file a motion for decertification if discovery reveals that certification was not appropriate.  If the plaintiff can show that there are others that are “similarly situated,” he will be allowed to send notice to such individuals.  Although the Eleventh Circuit has not provided a specific definition for “similarly situated,” the Court has made it clear that “similarly situated” includes more than just the mere facts of job duties and pay provisions.  Instead, the court will consider job titles, if the potential plaintiffs worked at the same geographical location, the extent to which different time periods and different decision makers were involved, and whether the alleged treatment of each potential plaintiff is similar to that of the named plaintiffs.

If the plaintiff is allowed to send notice, the employer is only required to provide information on “similarly situated” employees for the past three (3) years because the longest applicable statute of limitations is three (3) years, which requires a finding of willful violations.  Also, courts may limit notice to a particular geographical area.  This includes a specific facility, terminal, office branch, etc.  Notice should include information concerning any fees or advances a plaintiff would be obligated to pay; that the court has not expressed an opinion concerning the merits of FLSA claims; and that it is an action seeking overtime from a specific employer that they may join.  In matters where the defendants are unable to provide plaintiffs with adequate information concerning former employees who were potential class members, notice via newspaper, radio and/or posts may be permitted.

Once discovery is complete, the employer has the right to file a motion for decertification, asserting that the individuals are not “similarly situated” and that the action should not be allowed to proceed to trial as a collective action.  At this point, the plaintiff burden is much higher.  However, it could be argued that the damage has been done because the plaintiff has been provided contact information of former and/or current employees who may have FLSA claims and may subject the employer to signification FLSA litigation whether proceeding as a collective action or individual claims.

For more information, please contact Tim Buckley at (404) 633-9230.

Bad Faith Claims Against Insurance Companies For Failure to Pay Claims

O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 provides a cause of action for penalties and attorney’s fees when an insurer is guilty of “bad faith” in refusing to pay a claim submitted by its insured. This statute addresses losses covered by insurance an insurance policy where the insurance company refuses to pay for such loss within 60 days after a demand has been made by the holder of the policy. To prevail on a claim for an insurer’s bad faith, the insured must prove: (1) that a demand for payment was lodged against the insurer at least 60 days prior to filing suit and (2) that the insurer’s failure to pay was motivated by bad faith. “The purpose of the statute’s demand requirement is to adequately notify an insurer that it is facing a bad faith claim so that it may make a decision about whether to pay, deny or further investigate the claim within the 60-day deadline.” Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Humfleet, 217 Ga.App. 770, 458 S.E.2d 908 (1995).

The demand must notify the insurance company with some degree of specificity that the insured is asserting a claim for bad faith. Id. The demand may not be sent unless the insured’s right to payment has vested under the policy. “Demand must be made at a time when the insured is legally in a position to demand immediate payment, and it is not in order if the insurer has additional time left under the terms of the insurance policy in which to investigate or adjust the loss and therefore has no duty to pay at the time the demand is made.” Dixie Construction Products, Inc. v. WMH, Inc., 179 Ga.App. 658, 659, 347 S.E.2d 303, 304 (1986).

After showing that a timely demand was sent, the insured must demonstrate that the refusal to pay the claim was in “bad faith.” Federal Ins. Co. v. National Distributing Co., Inc., 203 Ga.App. 763, 768, 417 S.E.2d 671, 676 (1992). Although the statute does not define “bad faith,” the Court of Appeals has held that bad faith under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 means “a frivolous and unfounded refusal to pay a claim.” United Services Automobile Association v. Carroll, 226 Ga.App. 144, 148, 486 S.E.2d 613, 616 (1997). In those cases in which an insured is successful in pursuing a bad faith claim under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6, the insurance company has typically failed to conduct a proper investigation of the claim. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 201 Ga.App. 676, 411 S.E.2d. 791 (1991).

For more information, please contact Denny Brown at (404) 633-9230.

Statutes of Limitation for Breach of Contracts

Many companies are having trouble collecting on invoices after having rendered the services or delivered goods. But with this economy, what options do you have?

A client’s failure to pay for services rendered or goods delivered pursuant to contract constitutes a “breach of contract.” If you can’t otherwise get your client to pay, then you may sue for the payment in state court in a breach of contract action.

When the amount due is relatively small, it may be easiest and best to file suit in “small claims” or “magistrate” court. Some courts have minimum amounts to sue starting at $1,000 and all have maximums ranging up to about $15,000. In Georgia, the court is called “Magistrate court” and handles money claims of less than $15,000. Even if you’re owed more than the maximum, you can forego the excess and seek the maximum allowed by the small claims court. The filing fee varies by county and can range from approximately $45 to $55, which includes the charge to serve one defendant. An extra charge for service for any additional defendants usually ranges from $25 to $35 per defendant.

Some states will not allow attorneys to represent the parties in small claims courts. But in Georgia, you may choose to have an attorney assist you in Magistrate Court. An attorney is advisable if the opposing party has counsel.

Since the economy has slowed, some clients don’t have money now. So you may want to wait a bit to sue, hoping that the client gets money later (balancing the risk that the client will go out of business). But the time that you have to make your claim is limited. This is based on a legal principle called “the statute of limitations.” Statutes of limitation, in general, are laws that prescribe the time limits during which you can file lawsuits. The deadlines vary with the type of claim and depend on the state where the claim is made. The purpose of them is to reduce the unfairness of defending actions after a substantial period of time has elapsed. They allow people to go on with their lives, regardless of guilt, after a certain amount of time has passed.

In the United States, the statute of limitations to sue for breach of a written contract ranges from 3-15 years. In Georgia, the statute of limitations for a written contract is six years. So whether you file suit now or later, be sure to take steps to protect your business!

For more information, please contact Tim Buckley at (404) 633-9230.