Does Workers’ Compensation Cover the Willful Acts of Third Persons?

On Friday, April 25, 2008, a secretary with an Atlanta downtown law firm was shot and killed by a co-worker during lunch.  This was a tragic event that will be investigated by the authorities.  Along with her unfortunate loss, her employer will also have to address the question of whether her death is compensable under workers’ compensation.

 

The Georgia Board of WorkersCompensation examines two issues to establish whether workers’ compensation covers the willful acts of third person.  As a general rule, where an employee is free to use time for the employee’s individual affairs and an injury occurs during this time, the injury is not compensable.  However, if the employee is conducting the employer’s business during the break, the injury would be compensable.  Further, where an injury or death of an employee arises from the willful act of a co-employee or third party, the attack must be related to work in some way, rather than from personal animosity, to render the death or injury compensable.  

 

In this instance, a co-employee (who worked for a temporary agency) from the law firm’s records room approached the secretary at lunch outside at a picnic area.  After a quarrel, the co-employee shot the secretary and then killed himself.  What remains to be determined is the nature of their relationship and if anyone overheard the substance of the escalating conversation.  If the shooting was the result of a rebuffed personal advance or a soured personal relationship, the death would not be work-related.  Conversely, if the co-employee was angry about a job request or assignment given to him from the secretary, the death could be compensable.  Finally, if the secretary was on her free time for lunch but was working on employment-related business, the injury by a co-employee for personal reasons likely would not be compensable.  It would be the same as if the injury occurred during any hour of the day at work.  Of course, to make a final determination of compensability in any case, the specific facts must be examined.

For more information, please contact Catherine Dellinger Buckley at (404) 633-9230.